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NOTE ON PARETO OPTIMA 
by Mikio Nakayama 
It is well-known that a Pareto optimum is attained where a positive 
linear combination of utility functions of al individuals achieves its max-
imum (see, e. g., Takayama [4, Theorem 1. E. ,6.]). But, to state the 
converse of this theorem we usually need the assumption of concavity of 
utility functions (see, Takayama [4, Theorem 1. E. 4.]). The purpose of 
this note is to give a simple alternative characterization for a Pareto 
optimum in terms of some real-valued function. The necessary and suf-
ficient condition we give here requires no convexity assumptions at al. 
Now, let N= {1, 2, ... , n} be the set of al individuals. For each iE.N, 
ui(x) is a continuous real-valued function defined on R'"/:-, the nonnegative 
orthant of m-dimensional Euclidean space. Let X be a nonempty subset 
of R'f_. X is interpreted as a feasible set of “social states’， and ui(x), the 
utility of individual i under a social state x. Let us normalize the utility 
functions, so that ui(O) =O for each i己N. We assume that: 
Assumption 1. If z巴X and z手0,then u/x)>O for al iE.N. 
This is a much weaker assumption than strict monotonicity. We say x＊εx 
is Pareto optimal if uJx)>ui(x*) for al tεN implies xfl_X. Note that 
the optimality is used in a weak sense. To characterize a Pareto optimum, 
we define the following real-valued function v(x, a): 
り（x,a)=minf~主2), for al 記 Xand for al 記 A＝｛αξR+:2.Ja;=l}. 
i l a; J i~N 
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Here the notation min is used to mean the minimum taken over al i巴N
such that ai>O. Note that v(x, a) is continuous on X×A. Then we 
can state: 
Theorem. x＊εX isPareto optimal if and only if there is an a巴A such 
that 
り（x*,a) =max v(x, a). 
XEX 
Proof. Suppose x* is not Pareto optimal. Then, there is an zεX such 
that uJめ＞ui(x*)for al iE.N. Hence ui(x）／内＞ui(x*) / aifor al tξN 
with ai>O. Hence we have v（同 α）＞v(x*,a),a contradiction. 
Conversely, let x* be Pareto optimal. By Assumption 1, if x＊千0,we 
have ui（どり＞Ofor al iE.N. Hence for any xE.X we have min{u；（め／ui
iEN 
(x＊）｝豆1,for we would otherwise have a contradiction that ui(x)>ui(x*) 
for al iE.N. Now, define 孟＝（孟I• ••• ' an) EA by 
孟i=u;(x*)/2J uj(x*), for each iE.N 
jEN 
Then, for any xE.X we have 
v(x＊，孟）=min{ui(x＊）／弘｝=2J Uj(X＊）と2jUj(x＊）〔min{u;(x)/ui(x＊）｝ユ
iEN jEN jEN iEN 
=min｛〔ui(x)/ui(x*)]2J uj(x*)} =v（引の，
iEN jEN 
or 
v(x＊，亘.）＝mαxv(x，瓦〉．
xEX 
If x*=O, then for any xE.X there is an i巴N such that ui（ニピ）=0, since 
x* is Pareto optimal. But, then, itmust not be true that z手0,for we 
would otherwise have ui(x)>O for al iE.N by Assumption 1. Hence X= 
{x勺， and this implies that v（どへa)=max v(x, a) for any aE.A. 
Z巴X
Q. E. D. 
Note that we do not need the concavity of ui, nor the convexity of X. 
In practice, however, X is often a convex set, and utiiity functions are 
assumed to be quasiconcave. In this case, we can show that the function 
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り（x,a) is also quasiconcave on X, i. e., x,y巴Xand O三h豆1imply v(hx+ 
(1-h)y, a）ミmin{v(x,a), v(y, a)}. 
Proposition. Let X be convex. If u;(x) is quasiconcave on X for each 
t巴N,then v(x, a) is also quasiconcave on X. 
Proof. Let x, yE.X, and let O手h孟1. Then, 
v(hx+ (1-h)y, a) =min(u;(hx+ (1-h)y）／向）
三min{(l/ai)min{ui(x), ui(Y)}} 
三min(m_in(u/x）／αi},m~n{ui(Y）／αj}} 
=min{v(x, a），り（y,a)}.
Q. E. D. 
The theorem and the proposition together define an upper hemi-continuous 
correspondence that associates to every a巴A a convex set of Pareto opti-
mal states; namely, 
X（α）＝｛xE.X:v(x，めとり（云，a)for al正巳X}.
Since v(x, a) is continuous, X（α） is a closed correspondence with a com-
pact range X. Thus it is upper hemi-continuous (see Hildenbrand and 
Kirman [1. p. 194]). Such a correspondence is useful in some existence 
proofs (see, e. g., Nakayama [2]). 
Finally, note that Assumption 1 is crucial in stating our theorem. 
Without this assumption, the “only if＇’part of the theorem is not always true 
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The weak Pareto frontier may contain the segment 
PQ. But any point on PQ other than Q can not be expressed as a max-
imum of v(x, a) for any aE.A. The occurrence of such a case may also 
be avoided by the following assumption. 
Assumption 1’The interior of Xis nonempty, and ui(x)>O for al iE.N 
if x is an interior point of X. 
Under this assumption, whenever x* is Pareto optimal there will be an 
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U2 
p Q 
u, 
zξX in any neighborhood of x* such that uJx)>O for al tεN. Thus, 
the above possibility is ruled out. 
foot note 1). This characterization is reminiscent of the well-known dif-
ference principle of Rawls [3]. Thus, v（ια） can be viewed as a Rawlsian 
social welfare function while the linear combination Z 内向（x)is inter-
iEN 
preted as a utilitarian social welfare function. 
REFERENCES 
[ 1 J Hidenbrand, W. and A. P. Kirman，“Introduction to Equilibrium Analysis勺
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1976. 
[ 2] Nakayama, M., An Existence Proof of a Pareto Optimal Allocation under a 
Proportional Income Tax in a Public Goods Economy, The Economic Studies 
Quarterly 29 (1978). 
〔3] Rawls, ］.，“A Theory of Justice”， Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971. 
[ 4] Takayama A.，“Mathematical EconomicsヘTheDryden Press, Ilinois, 1974. 
-198ー
